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This is a compiex case. It involves three industrial injuries, one non-industrial 
injury, two sureties and starkly contrasting medical opinions. When, however, the case is 
unwound, one thing is clear: General Insurance Company has paid all of the worker's 
compensation benefits it owes. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues are: 
1. Whether claimant is entitled to additional medical benefits; 
2. Whether claimant is entitled to additional temporary disability benefits; 
3. Whether claimant is entitled to additional permanent partial impairment 
benefits; 
4. Whether claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot 
doctrine, and, if so, how the total and permanent disability should be 
apportioned; 
5. Whether claimant has sustained a permanent partial disability in excess of 
impairment and, if so, how the permanent partial disability should be 
apportioned; and 
6. Attorney fees. 
(Tr., pp. 8-11). 
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III. 
THE INJURIES AND SURETIES 
On May 5, 1996, claimant sustained a hernia while lifting flower pots from a 
boat in the course of his employment with his employer, the Hagadone Corporation 
("Hagadone") (Tr, p. 57, LL 3-19). General Insurance Company ("General") was 
Hagadone' s surety at the time. General accepted liability for the claim. 
On July 24, 1997, claimant was rear-ended while he was stopped at a traffic 
light. (Tr., pp. 76-77). Claimant sustained neck, left shoulder and low back injuries as a 
consequence of the accident. (Tr., pp. 246-249). The automobile accident was not work-
related. Claimant, however, recovered a total of$65,062.40 from the other driver's insurer 
and his own insurer as a consequence of his injuries. (General's Exhibit E). 
On October 10, 1997, claimant sustained a low back injury while putting away 
concrete flower pots in the course of his employment with Hagadone. (Tr., pp. 89-90). 
General was still Hagadone's surety and again accepted liability for the claim. 
On May 11, 1999, claimant sustained a low back injury when he fell while 
cutting grass in the course of his employment for Hagadone. (Tr., pp. 101-102). 
Hagadone's surety at that time was Royal Indemnity Company ("Royal"). Royal accepted 
liability for the claim. 
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A. The May 5, 1996 Hernia. 
Claimant's hernia was surgically repaired by Dr. Pennings on February 26, 
1997. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 2). Claimant, however, continued to experience hernia-
related discomfort, and so on November 14, 1997, a second surgery was performed, this time 
by Dr. West. During the surgery, Dr. West performed a neurolysis of the iliolingual nerve 
and removed a piece ofGortex mesh. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, pp. 74-75). 
Dr. West declared claimant medically stable as of May 19, 1998. (Claimant's 
Exhibit 2, p.35). Dr. West also released claimant to return to his pre-injury job - albeit, 
with a thirty pound lifting restriction. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 19). 
Dr. West initially assigned a 5% of the whole person pennanent partial 
impairment rating regarding the hernia. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 35). After General sought 
clarification of the basis for the rating, Dr. West indicated that the rating was 10 to 19% of 
the whole person. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, pp. 36-37). On October 17, 1998, after General 
once again sought clarification, Dr. West assigned a final rating of 10% of the whole person. 
(Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 3 8). General paid the 10% rating in full. 
Claimant has not received any hernia-related medical treatment since March 
19, 1998. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, pp. 3-4). 
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B. The July 24, 1997 Auto Accident. 
Claimant sustained neck, left shoulder and low back injuries as a consequence 
of the July 24, 1997 auto accident (Tr., pp.77-78 and 246-249). 
Claimant initially sought medical treatment from Dr. West, who prescribed 
physical therapy. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 1). Claimant underwent physical therapy from 
July 29, 1997 through October 10, 1997. (Claimant's Exhibit 10, pp. 1-19). 
Claimant later sought treatment for his neck and shoulder from Dr. Treolar and 
Dr. French. (Claimant's Exhibits 1 and 3). Dr. French diagnosed cervical instability and 
left shoulder instability. (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 11). · Dr. French recommended that 
claimant undergo surgery for his left shoulder injury, but clamant declined. (Claimant's 
Exhibit 3, p. 12 and Tr., p. 240, LI. 18-25). 
On April 12, 1999, Dr. French stated that claimant's left shoulder condition 
was stable and that claimant had sustained a 20% of the whole person permanent partial 
impairment regarding his left shoulder. (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 27). He also opined that 
as a consequence of the left shoulder injury, claimant has the following permanent 
limitations: lifting up to 25 pounds from waist height on an occasional basis; lifting up to 15 
pound from waist height on a frequent basis; lifting 10 pounds to shoulder height on an 
occasional basis; lifting 5 pounds to shoulder height on a frequent basis; lifting 10 pounds 
above shoulder level on an occasional basis; and lifting 5 pounds above shoulder level on a 
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frequent basis. (Claimant's Exhibit 3, pp. 27-28). 
Ciaimant testified that he has experienced continual low back pain since the 
July 24, 1997 auto accident. (Tr., pp; 258-259). 
C. The October 10, 1997 Low Back Injury. 
On October 10, 1997, claimant felt pain in his low back while putting away 
concrete flower pots in the course of his employment for Hagadone. (Tr., pp. 89-90). 
On the day of the accident, claimant mentioned the injury to the physical 
therapist who was treating him for his auto accident-related injuries. (Claimant's Exhibit l 0, 
p. 19). Claimant also sought treatment from Dr. West and later from Dr. Treolar, who 
referred claimant to physical therapy. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 2 and Claimant's Exhibit 1, 
p. 60). Claimant underwent physical therapy between February 16, 1998 and April 2, 1998. 
(Claimant's Exhibit 11, pp.25-34). 
On or about April 13, 1998, Dr. Trealor concluded that claimant was stable, 
that he had sustained no impairment as a consequence of the October 10, 1997 low back 
injury, and that he was capable ofretuming to work without restrictions. (Claimant's Exhibit 
1, p. 18). Dr. Shanks- one of claimant's subsequent treating physicians - agreed with Dr. 
Treolar's conclusions. (Shanks Depo., p. 34, LL 12-23). 
On February 2, 2001, claimant was examined by Dr. Sears at the request of 
General. (General's Exhibit C). Dr. Sears concluded that claimant had sustained low back 
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pain as a consequence of the October 10, 1997 accident, but that claimant had sustained no 
permanent impairment@.). 
D. The May 11, 1999 Low Back Injury. 
On May 11, 1999, claimant slipped and fell while cutting the grass in the 
course ofhis employment for Hagadone. (Tr., pp. 101 -102). Claimant testified that the May 
11, 1999 injury "changed his life" and that "nothing has ever been the same since. My back 
has hurt so much-and I've been so miserable since then. It's not a good place." (Tr., p. 102, 
LI. 14-18). 
On May 12, 1999, claimant sought medical treatment from Dr. West, who 
diagnosed claimant's condition as a lumbar strain. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 4). Claimant 
later sought treatment from Dr. Shanks who restricted claimant from working and referred 
claimant for physical therapy. (Claimant's Exhibit 1, pp. 3-4 and 22). 
On November 11, 1999, claimant was examined by Dr. Adams, an orthopedic 
surgeon, at the request of Royal. (General's Exhibit A). Dr. Adams diagnosed claimant's 
condition as chronic low back pain. (Id.). Dr. Adams also concluded that claimant had 
sustained no permanent impairment and that he had reached maximum medical improvement. 
(Id.). 
Dr. Shanks disagrees with Dr. Adams. According to Dr. Shanks, claimant has 
a 10% of the whole person permanent partial impairment regarding his low back, 5% of 
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If claimant is totally disabled, it is due to the combined effects of the May 5, 
1996 hernia, the pre-existing degenerative condition of his low back, the July 24, 1997 auto 
accident-related back and left upper extremity injuries, and the May 11, 1999 low back 
injury. According to Dr. West, claimant has a 10% impairment attributable to the hernia. 
(Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 38). According to Dr. Shank's, claimant has a 5% impairment 
attributable to the degenerative condition in claimant's low back. (Shanks Depo., pp. 43-45). 
According to Dr. French, claimant has a 20% of the whole person impairment rating 
attributable to the left upper extremity. All of those impairments pre-existed the final work-
related injury - i.e., the May 11, 1999 low back injury. 
Additionally, those pre-existing impairments did constitute a subjective 
hindrance or obstacle to employment. According to claimant, the hernia-related symptoms 
and his low back condition significantly impacted his ability to perform his job with 
Hagadone. (Tr., p. 63, LI. 10-22 and General's Exhibit A, pp. 56-57). The left upper 
extremity impairment significantly affected claimant's ability to engage in his "side" topiary 
and tree trimming business. (Tr., pp. 252-253). Indeed, Dan Brownell testified that given 
claimant's upper extremity limitations, he is no longer capable of performing topiary work. 
(Tr., p. 175, LI. 12-20). 
If, therefore, claimant is totally and permanently disabled, then under Carey v. 
Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54 (1984) and Smith v. J.B. 
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Parson, liability must be apportioned between the surety on the last injury - Royal - and the 
ISIF. The apportionment should be as follows: I) claimant's impairments total 40%; 2) 5% 
of that 40% - i.e., I/8th- is attributable to Royal; 3) 35% of the 40% ~ i.e., 7/8th's - is 
attributable to the ISIF; 4) Royal is therefore liable for its 5% plus I/8th of the remaining 
60%; and 5) the ISIF is liable for the remainder of the total and permanent disability. 
Claimant asserts that no liability should be apportioned to the ISIF because the 
ISIF is not a party to this proceeding. It is claimant, however, and not defendants, who is 
asserting total and permanent disability. It was, therefore, his obligation to join the ISIF. · 
Furthermore, claimant is still free to proceed against the ISIF after the Commission issues 
its decision in this matter. 
If, however, the Commission_does not apportion liability to the ISIF, then the 
fact remains that none of the liability for claimant's alleged total and permanent disability 
should be apportioned to General. Claimant did sustain a 10% impairment as a consequence 
of the May 5, 1996 hernia, but he sustained no impairment as a consequence of the October 
10, 1997 low back injury. There can be no disability without impairment, and so the October 
10, 1997 low back injury cannot be considered in any apportionment calculation. 
Additionally, claimant missed no work as a consequence of either the May 5, 
1996 hernia or the October 10, 1997 low back injury; claimant's hourly wage for Hagadone 
increased after those injuries; and Dr. Shanks - claimant's treating doctor - testified that 
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claimant would have been able to work for Hagadone until retirement but for the May 11, 
1999 low back injury. (Tr., pp. 242-243 and Shanks Depo., p. 35, LI. 19-24). 
In short, the May 5, 1996 hernia and the October l 0, 1997 low back injury did 
not cause a decrease in claimant's wage earning capacity. Accordingly, none of clamant' s 
alleged total and permanent disability should be apportioned to General. 
E. Permanent Partial Disability in Excess of Impairment. 
1. Claimant has sustained no disability in excess of impairment as a 
consequence of the May 5, 1996 hernia and the October 10, 1997 low back 
injury .. 
As mentioned, claimant missed no work for Hagadone as a consequence of the 
May 5, 1996 hernia and the October ro, 1997 low back injury. Additionally, his hourly wage 
actually increased following those injuries. Those injuries, therefore, did not lead to a 
decrease in claimant's wage earning capacity- and certainly not a decrease in excess of the 
10% impairment rating assigned regarding the hernia. There is, therefore, no basis for 
awarding disability in excess of impairment regarding the injuries for which General has 
coverage. 
F. Attorney Fees. 
Claimant is not seeking attorney fees from General Insurance Company 
regarding the May 5, 1996 hernia or the October 10, 1997 low back injury. 
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General Insurance Company has paid all of the worker's compensation benefits 
it owes. 
DATED this 25th day of June, 2001. 
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I.C. NO. 99-016897 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY 
RULING 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
("ISIF"), by and through its counsel of record, Kenneth L. Mallea, of the firm Mallea Law 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 1 
Offices, and petitions the Industrial Commission ("Commission") for a declaratory ruling, 
pursuant to Rule XV of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Worker's 
Compensation Act. ISIF represents that: 
1. The ruling sought is within the jurisdiction of the Commission to determine in 
that it arises under the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law dated 
September 7, 2001, and the Commission's Order Regarding Reconsideration, dated 
December 14, 2001. The following issues are raised which need to be addressed: 
A) Whether the Commission should dismiss the complaint against ISIF 
because that action is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; 
B) Whether the Commission should dismiss the complaint against ISIF 
because the Employer/Surety waived its right to seek apportionment from ISIF; 
C) Whether the Commission's decision bars the Employer/Surety's 
complaint pursuant to I.C. § 72-718; 
D) Whether Surety waived its right to seek apportionment from ISIF or 
should be estopped from seeking such apportionment; 
E) Whether ISIF's constitutional due process rights will be denied if 
Employer/Surety is allowed to proceed against ISIF; and, 
F) Whether the Employer/Surety's complaint should be dismissed as a 
matter of law because Employer/Surety cannot establish the requisite elements set 
forth in I.C. § 72-332 for ISIF liability. 
2. An actual controversy exists as to these matters by virtue of the complaint 
Employer/Surety has now filed against ISIF seeking apportionment for an award 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 2 
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entered against Surety in the Commission's previous decision. 
3. ISIF has an interest in the matter and issues raised by virtue of its potential 
liability for apportionment should the Commission allow Employer/Surety's complaint to 
proceed. 
4. A memorandum in support of this Petition is filed contemporaneously 
herewith citing the law and facts upon which this Petition is based; 
5. Service of this Petition has been made on all parties to the above-entitled 
action. 
DATED This nay of October, 2002. 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for Defendant/lSIF 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING· 3 
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COMES NOW DEFENDANT, State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
("ISIF"), by and through its counsel of record, Kenneth l. Mallea, of the firm Mallea Law 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING-
Offices, and submits the following Memorandum in Support ofits Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling. For purposes of ISIF's Petition for Declaratory Ruling, the Petition 
and this Memorandum is based on the files, records and pleadings in Industrial 
Commission Case Nos. 96-018310, 97-036904, and 99-016897. ISIF specifically 
reserves the right, however, to challenge the evidence, findings and conclusions in 
those cases if the Commission does not dismiss The Hagadone Corporation's and 
Royal Indemnity Company's (collectively referred to here in "Surety") complaint 
pursuant to ISIF's Petition for Declaratory Ruling. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Claimant filed a complaint against Surety on April 17, 2000. The facts of that 
underlying action are set forth in the Commission"s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Recommendation, ,i,i 1-45, dated September 7, 2001. That litigation 
occurred in Industrial Commission case numbers 96-018310, 97-036904, and 99-
016897. Neither Claimant nor Surety joined ISIF in that action. Neither Claimant nor 
Surety filed a complaint against ISIF in that prior action. ISIF was not a party to that 
proceeding. 
After extensive discovery and preparation by the parties, Referee Michael E. 
Powers heard the matter on March 14, 2001. One of the issues listed by the parties 
which was expressly before the referee was whether Claimant was entitled to 
permanent and total disability benefits. March 14, 2001, Hearing Transcript ("Tr."), p. 
10, LL. 5-10. The Commission's September 7, 2001, decision, Issue #4 states, 
"Whether, and to what extent, Claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING- 2 
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benefits, including whether Claimant is permanently and totally disabled pursuant 
to the odd-lot doctrine;". (emphasis added). 
Claimant contended throughout the prior proceedings that he was permanently 
and totally disabled. September 7, 2001 Recommendation, Contention of Parties, ,r 1. 
Evidence regarding Claimant's pre-existing degenerative disc disease was introduced 
at the hearing, as well as evidence regarding Claimant's accident/injuries which 
occurred prior to the May 11, 1999 injury which occurred while Claimant was employed 
with The Hagadone Corporation. Findings of Fact, ,r,r 2-11. 
The Commission found that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled 
pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. Findings of Fact, ,r,r 40-43; Conclusions of Law, ,r 5. 
The Surety introduced evidence from its retained certified rehabilitation counselor, 
Daniel R. McKinney, in an effort to rebut Claimant's contention that he was permanently 
and totally disabled pursuant to the odd lot doctrine. The Surety introduced Mr. 
McKinney's testimony in an effort to rebut the argument that Claimant was 
unemployable absent a sympathetic employer. September 7, 2001 decision, ,r,r 34-36. 
On December 14, 2001, the Commission filed its Order Regarding 
Reconsideration. In that Order, p. 2, the Commission stated in pertinent part, 
... Claimant experienced four accidents that eventually rendered Claimant 
totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine . .. ISIF was 
never included as a party to these proceedings . 
... The Commission is unaware of any guidance for determining a percentage 
only for Employer's liability in total and permanent disability cases with pre-
existing impairment and/or disability. 
Under the facts of this case, the Commission has determined that the last 
accident caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent disability. No other 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING- 3 
facts or circumstances have been presented to the Commission. 
Accordingly, the Commission finds that Royal should be fully liable for 
total and permanent disability benefits. (emphasis added). 
Amending its September 7, 2001, decision the Commission stated that the Surety was 
liable for Claimant's total and permanent disability pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine and 
was liable for all such benefits owing to Claimant. Order Regarding Reconsideration, 
,rn 2 and 4. 
The Surety did not appeal either the September 7, 2001, or the December 14, 
2001, Commission decisions. Over five (5) months later, on May 22, 2002, the Surety 
filed a complaint against ISIF, seeking apportionment from ISIF for part of the award the 
Commission ordered it to pay Claimant. On June 4, 2002, ISIF answered the Surety's 
complaint, alleging a number of affirmative defenses. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. SURETY'S COMPLAINT AGAINST ISIF IS BARRED PURSUANT TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
Jackman v. Industrial Special lndem. Fund, 129 Idaho 689,931 P.2d 1207 
(1997) is on point with the instant case and supports the conclusion that the Surety is 
barred from pursuing ISIF for apportionment pursuant to the doctrine of collateral 
estoppal. In Jackman, claimant settled his claims against the employer/surety pursuant 
to a lump sum agreement on February 8, 1990. On February 20, 1990, the 
Commission entered an order approving the agreement and discharging the 
employer/surety of all liability relating to claimant's accident. On January 25, 1994, 
claimant filed an application requesting a hearing for compensation and award against 
the ISIF. Id. at 690. As in the instant case, the ISIF in Jackman was not a party to 
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proceeding which resulted in a final award between the claimant and the 
employer/surety. The Court in Jackman applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel and 
precluded Jackman's claim against the ISIF. 
The Court stated, 
ISIF argues that Jackman's claim against ISIF is collaterally 
estopped. we agree. 
In Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,849 P.2d 107 
(1993), this Court set forth the appropriate test for determining whether 
collateral estoppel, (issue preclusion), will prevent the relitigation of issues 
actually decided in a prior case: 
(1) Did the party "against whom the earlier decision is asserted ... 
have a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case?'" (2) 
Was the issue decided in the prior litigation "identical with the one 
presented in the action in question?" (3) Was the issue actually decided in 
the prior litigation? This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue 
was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." (4) "Was there a final judgment on 
the merits?" (5) "Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party 
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?". Magic Valley Radiology, 
P.A., 123 Idaho at 439, 849 P.2d at 112. 
Jackman contends that in his previous case against [employer/surety] he 
was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of apportionment 
pursuant to J.C. Section 72-332. Jackman's present claim against ISIF for 
apportionment is tied to the same impairment rating Jackman relied upon in his 
claim against (employer/surety]: 33% whole person impairment. Jackman had a 
fair opportunity and incentive to vigorously litigate his whole person impairment 
rating in Jackman's case against [employer/surety]. 
Jackman argues the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be applied 
in this case since the issue in the present case is distinguishable from the issue 
raised in Jackman's action against [employer/surety]. 
Jackman contends that the issue in Jackman's case against SIF was the 
total value of Jackman's claim against SIF and that the apportioning of benefits 
between ISIF and SIF was never addressed in the Agreement. ... 
. . . Jackman cannot rely upon the same percentage impairment rating in 
order to attain further benefits from ISIF. Jackman must present additional 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING- 5 
evidence of impairment in order to increase his impairment rating. The issue 
presented in the proceeding against [employer/surety], compensating 
Jackman for his impairment rating of 33% whole person, is identical to the 
issue Jackman presently raises: whether ISIF must compensate Jackman 
for a portion of the same 33% whole person impairment . 
• 
In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppal to apply, there must be final 
judgment on the merits. On February 20, 1990, the commission approved the 
Agreement, including the 33% whole person impairment rating, pursuant to I.C. 
Section 72-404 .... The Commission's February 20, 1990 order, approving the 
Agreement pursuant to I.C. Section 72-404, was a final judgment on the merits . 
. Despite the fact that ISIF was not a party to Jackman's Agreement 
with [employer/surety], ISIF may still assert the doctrine of collateral 
estoppal in the present case. Jackman was a party to the prior action 
against [employer/surety] and is the party against whom the plea of 
collateral estoppal has been asserted .... (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
Id. at 691-692. 
As Jackman argued, Surety will likely argue that apportionment to the ISIF was 
not an issue in the prior action and therefore collateral estoppal should not apply. As in 
Jackman, however, the Surety was a party to the prior action and is the party against 
whom ISIF asserts the plea of collateral estoppal. Surety vigorously contested 
Claimant's allegation that he was permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the odd 
lot doctrine. Surety cannot argue that it did not know that Claimant was claiming he 
was totally and permanently disabled. The record below is replete with evidence 
regarding Claimant's pre-existing conditions/injuries. Surety had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the effect of those injuries on Claimant and the allegation that he 
was permanently and totally disabled. Surety took advantage of that opportunity by 
introducing expert testimony designed to rebut the Claimant's argument that he was 
totally disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. 
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Surety also had a full and fair opportunity to join ISIF in the prior proceeding and 
argue that ISIF was liable for a portion of Claimant's benefits. Surety failed to join ISIF 
in that proceeding. As in Jackman, Surety in this case is seeking to raise the identical 
issue already decided in the prior action - whether ISIF must pay a portion of 
Claimant's benefits which the prior decision determined Claimant was entitled to receive 
and which Surety was responsible for paying. The Commission already found that, 
. Claimant experienced four accidents that eventually rendered Claimant totally 
and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine .... ISIF was never 
included as a party to these proceedings .... Under the facts of this case, the 
last accident caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent disability. No other 
facts or circumstances have been presented to the Commission. Accordingly, 
the Commission finds that Royal should be fully liable for total and permanent 
disability benefits. 
Order Regarding Reconsideration, p. 2. 
Surety never appealed the Commission's final judgment. Instead, it chose to 
wait five months and then file a separate action against ISIF seeking to relitigate the 
very issue that the Commission had already decided -- liability for Claimant's disability 
benefits. ISIF anticipates that Surety will try to rely on the very same evidence and 
determinations made in the prior action to argue that ISIF should be liable for a portion 
of Claimant's benefits. That is exactly what the doctrine of collateral estoppal was 
designed to prohibit. All of the elements of collateral estoppel are met in this case. The 
Commission should dismiss with prejudice Surety's complaint against ISIF pursuant to 
the doctrine of collateral estoppal. 
B. THE COMMISSION'S PRIOR. FINAL DECISION BARS SURETY'S 
COMPLAINT AGAINST ISIF PURSUANT TO I.C. § 72-718. 
I.C. § 72-718 states in pertinent part that, "A decision of the commission, in the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING- 7 
• 
absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the 
commission upon filing the decision in the office of the commission ... " The 
Commission's September 7, 2001, Findings and Conclusions and its December 14, 
2001, Order Regarding Reconsideration are final and conclusive as to all matters 
adjudicated therein. Surety failed to appeal either of those decisions. Surety has made 
no allegation that the Commission's prior decision was tainted by fraud. 
The Commission adjudicated whether Claimant was totally and permanently 
disabled in the prior action. Claimant raised that as an issue before the hearing officer 
and evidence was presented on his prior injuries/accidents. Claimant argued that he 
was totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine and Surety 
presented evidence in an attempt to rebut that argument. The Commission found that 
Claimant was totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. The 
Commission then concluded, 
Claimant experienced four accidents that eventually rendered Claimant totally 
and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine .... ISIF was never 
included as a party to these proceedings .... Under the facts of this case, the 
last accident caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent disability. No 
other facts or circumstances have been presented to the Commission. 
Accordingly, the Commission finds that Royal should be fully liable for total 
and permanent disability benefits. (emphasis added). 
Order Regarding Reconsideration, p. 2. 
Surety's current complaint against ISIF seeks apportionment of Claimant's 
disability benefit award. In other words, Surety seeks to be relieved of a portion of its 
responsibility regarding Claimant's benefits -- a responsibility the Commission has 
already decided belongs solely with Surety. The Commission already decided that the 
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last accident caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent disability; Yet Surety's 
current complaint against ISIF requests apportionment, which necessary would 
contravene the Commission's prior decision that Surety was solely liable for Claimant's 
total and permanent disability; Surety's new position that ISIF is liable for some portion 
of Claimant's benefit payments is contrary to the Commission's previous final and 
conclusive determination that Surety "should be fully liable for [Claimant's] total and 
permanent disability benefits." 
The Commission's prior decision in this case bars Surety's current complaint 
against ISIF. See also, Whittaker v. Cecil, 69 S.W.3d 69 (Ky 2002) (Compensation 
board's final award and employer's failure to raise apportionment argument against 
special fund on reconsideration or on appeal barred employer's subsequent action 
against special fund.). The Commission should hold that its prior decision in this matter 
bars Surety's current complaint against ISIF. The Commission should dismiss that 
complaint with prejudice. 
C. SURETY WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO APPORTIONMENT FROM ISIF BY 
FAILING TO JOIN ISIF IN THE PRIOR ACTION. THE COMMISSION SHOULD 
ESTOP SURETY FROM CLAIMING APPORTIONMENT FROM ISIF IN THIS 
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING. 
It is undisputed that Surety never joined ISIF in the prior proceeding and never 
raised the issue of ISIF's liability for apportionment in that prior action. Surety had 
notice that an issue of potential ISIF apportionment may apply and had plenty of 
opportunity to join ISIF in the prior action. The Commission expressly noted the fact 
that ISIF was never included as a party in the proceeding and also commented on the 
lack of guidance in Idaho case law for determining a percentage only for Employer's 




liability in a total and permanent disability case with pre-existing impairment and/or 
disability. Order Regarding Reconsideration, p. 2. Yet Surety failed to take any action 
to make ISIF a party to the prior action. Surety's failure in this regard constitutes a 
waiver of its right to seek apportionment from ISIF in this subsequent proceeding. The 
Commission should also estop Surety from seeking apportionment from ISIF now, well 
after the Commission's prior decision has become final and binding. 
WAIVER: 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. 
Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,734,639 P.2d 432 (1981). "Waiver arising out 
of conduct is in the nature of estoppal." Idaho Bank of Commerce v. Chastain, 86 
Idaho 146,383 P.2d 849 (1963). Surety cannot credibly deny that it was not fully aware 
that Claimant was alleging total and permanent disability from the very beginning of the 
prior action. That issue was listed as one to be litigated at the hearing and listed in the 
referee's Recommendation. Surety cannot deny that extensive evidence was 
introduced on Claimant's pre-existing conditions. Surety cannot deny that it spent time 
preparing to rebut that evidence by the introduction of its own expert testimony. Surety 
litigated with vigor Claimant's assertion that he was totally and permanently disabled 
under the odd-lot doctrine. Yet Surety did not join ISIF in the prior proceeding. Under 
these facts, the Commission should conclude that Surety waived its right to seek 
apportionment from ISIF. 
ESTOPPEL: 
In the alternative, the Commission should conclude that Surety's should be 
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esfopped from seeking apportionment from ISIF . 
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. . . The doctrine of quasi-estoppal has its basis in acceptance of 
benefits; it precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a 
right inccmsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The 
doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to 
maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of 
which he accepted a benefit. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,281,486 
P.2d 992,994 (1971). The act of the party against whom the estoppel is 
sought must have gained some advantage to himself or produced some 
disadvantage to another; or the person invoking the estoppal must have been 
induced to change his position. Id., 94 Idaho at 281, 486 P.2d at 994 (citations 
omitted). (emphasis added). 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppal does not require a false representation. It is designed to 
prevent a party from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by 
changing positions. Young v. Idaho Department of Law Enforcement, Alcohol 
Beverage Control Division, 123 Idaho 870, 875, 853 P.2d 615 (Ct.App. 1993). "The 
doctrine of quasi-estoppal may be invoked against a person asserting a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him, with knowledge of the facts and his 
rights, to the detriment of the person seeking to apply the doctrine." (citation omitted). 
Young, 123 Idaho at 875. 
Surety's complaint for apportionment against ISIF asserts a position that is 
inconsistent with the position previously taken by Surety in the prior action with 
Claimant. Surety had knowledge of facts regarding Claimant's assertion of total and 
permanent disability and facts relating to his pre-existing impairments. Surety certainly 
is held to know its rights in these circumstances, as it was represented at all times by 
competent and experienced counsel. A mistake of law does not entitle Surety to relief 
as there is no showing in the record of overreaching or unconscionable conduct which 
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might have justified Surety's failure to join ISIF in the prior proceeding. See e.g., Rivera 
v. Johnston, 71 Idaho 70, 79,225 P.2d 858 (1950). 
Surety acquiesced, throughout the prior proceeding with Claimant, with the 
position that apportionment to ISIF was not appropriate. Surety failed to join ISIF or 
contend that any portion of Claimant's award was ISIF's responsibility in the prior 
action. All of this worked to the detriment of ISIF, because Surety is now trying to use 
the Commission's prior findings of fact and conclusions of law to impose apportionment 
against ISIF. Under the circumstances of this case, the Commission should estop 
Surety's from seeking apportionment from ISIF and dismiss Surety's complaint. 
D. ALLOWING SURETY TO PROCEED IN ITS COMPLAINT AGAINST ISIF 
WOULD BE A DENIAL OF ISIF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 
Surety seeks to use the Commission's prior decision that Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine as well as the evidence admitted 
in that prior decision regarding Claimant's pre-existing conditions as the basis for its 
argument that ISIF is liable for a portion of Claimant's benefit payments. ISIF was not, 
however, a party to the prior action. ISIF never had the opportunity to litigate any of the 
myriad issues relating to ISIF liability, such as whether Claimant had a pre-existing 
physical impairment, whether that impairment was manifest, whether the impairment 
was a subjective hindrance and whether the alleged impairment combined with or was 
aggravated by the industrial injury in causing total disability. All of these elements are 
necessary in order to establish ISIF liability. See Garcia v. J.R. Simplot, 115 Idaho 966, 
772 P.2d 173 (1989). 
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State and federal constitutional rights to procedural due process require that ISIF 
receive adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on an issue that 
affects its property interests. See· e.g., Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 
63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006 (2001). ISIF's property interests are directly affected by Surety's 
complaint which claims that ISIF is liable for paying a portion of Claimant's disability 
benefits. 
Yet Surety never joined ISIF in the prior action. ISIF never had any notice of that 
action until it was served with the instant complaint. ISIF was deprived of any 
opportunity, much less a meaningful opportunity, to be heard on the issue of whether 
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. No party in the prior action represented 
ISIF's interests in litigating that issue. Allowing Surety to proceed against ISIF and rely 
on the Commission's prior factual findings and conclusions of law would unfairly 
prejudice ISIF. In that circumstance, ISIF would have been deprived of any opportunity 
to defend itself against the apportionment claim. 
Allowing Surety's complaint to go forward against ISIF is not a viable alternative 
at this point. ISIF is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard on all of these 
. issues. That would mean re-litigating· many of the issues already litigated in the prior 
action, such as evidence of Claimant's alleged pre-existing impairments and whether 
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. Re-litigating these issues runs contrary to 
the doctrine of collateral estoppal and I.C. § 72-718, as discussed above. It would also 
allow for inconsistent results in Commission proceedings, something the doctrine of 
collateral estoppal is designed to prevent. 
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Nor would ISIF be the only party prejudiced by Surety's new found desire to 
pursue ISIF apportionment. Claimant would suffer unfairly as well. Claimant has 
already proved his case against Surety and been awarded total and permanent 
disability benefits. One of the main concerns of the legislature in adopting the Workers' 
Compensation Act is that claimants receive compensation due in a timely manner. 
That goal is met here. The Commission has already decided that Surety is fully 
responsible for paying Claimant's total and permanent disability benefits. Surety's 
misguided effort to apportion some of those benefit payments to ISIF in this subsequent 
proceeding would force Claimant to expend the time and resources to re-litigate his 
claim of total and permanent disability, undermining the primary purposes of the Act. 
E. THE SURETY CANNOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER 1.C. § 
72-332. THIS FAILURE SUPPORTS THE DISMISSAL OF SURETY'S 
COMPLAINT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
I.C. § 72-332 addresses the conditions under which ISIF may have liability for a 
claimant's compensation benefits. Subsection (1) of that statute requires that the 
claimant must have a permanent physical impairment, incur a subsequent disability by 
injury or occupational disease arising from his employment, "and by reason of the 
combined effects of both the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury or 
occupational disease or by reason of the aggravation and acceleration of the pre-
existing impairment" suffer total and permanent disability. If Surety cannot prove facts 
establishing those prima facie elements, it has no claim for apportionment against ISIF. 
Surety cannot prove such facts in this case. 
The Commission held that, "Under the facts of this case, the Commission has 
determined that the last accident caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent 
disability." (emphasis added). Order Regarding Reconsideration, p. 2. This finding 
precludes any argument that any alleged pre-existing impairment "combined with" his 
last accident to render Claimant totally and permanently disabled. Surety cannot, 
without attempting to re-litigate an issue it has already litigated, prove the elements 
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necessary to establish ISIF liability under I.C. § 72-332. As discussed above, Surety is 
precluded from re-litigating matters that the Commission has already adjudicated in the 
prior action. The Commission should hold as a matter of law that Surety cannot 
establish a prima facie case of ISIF liability under the mandatory provisions of I.C. § 
72-332. Surety's failure in this regard justifies dismissal of its complaint with prejudice. 
The basis for ISIF liability under I.C. § 72-332(1) is that the claimant is owed 
additional income benefits, over and above the compensation benefits for which the 
employer and surety are liable. The Commission's prior decision in this case makes 
clear, however, that no additional income benefits are owing to Claimant. Surety has 
been determined to be "fully liable for total and permanent disability benefits." Again, 
Surety cannot make out a case under I.C. § 72-332 for ISIF liability. 
Finally, I.C. § 72-332 does not provide Surety a basis to seek indemnity or 
contribution for liabilities the Commission has determined are Surety's responsibility. 
That is the crux of Surety's complaint against ISIF - that Surety is entitled to indemnity 
or contribution from ISIF. ISIF is unaware of any legal basis for Surety's indemnity or 
contribution claim against ISIF under the facts of this case. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, ISIF respectfully requests that the Commission 
issue a declaratory ruling in accordance with the arguments set forth above and dismiss 
with prejudice the Surety's complaint against ISIF. 
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DATED this~ of October, 2002. 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
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COMES NOW DEFENDANT, State ofidaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund . 
("ISIF''), by and through its counsel of record, Kenneth L. Mall ea, of the firm Mall ea Law 
Offices, and submits the following Memorandum in Response to The Hagadone Corporation and 
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Royal Indemnity Company's ( collectively referred to herein as "Surety") Memorandum in 
Opposition to ISIF' s Petition for Declaratory Ruling. 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. SURETY CONSISTENTLY IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE COMMISSION HAS 
ALREADY MADE THE FACTUAL FINDING THAT THE CLAIMANT'S LAST ACCIDENT 
CAUSED CLAIMANT TO SUFFER TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY. THE 
COMMISSION CANNOT IMPOSE LIABILITY ON THE ISIF INA SUBSEQUENT 
PROCEEDING WITHOUT CONTRADICTING ITS PRIOR DEC1SION. THE DOCTRINE 
OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES RE-LITIGATING ISSUES DECIDED IN THE 
PRIOR PROCEEDING 
Surety argues that it does not assert that the Commission's prior decision or findings are 
binding upon the ISIF. Surety argues that the purpose of its complaint is to determine whether 
. claimant is totally disabled, and if so, whether ISIF is liable for any portion of the payments 
owing for that total and permanent disability. Defendants Employer/Surety's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Petition for Declaratory Relief ("Surety's Oppos. Memo"), p. 6-7. The Surety's 
argument is without merit. 
1. Surety Ignores The Commission's Prior Factual Finding That Claimant's Last 
Accident Caused Claimant To Suffer Total And Permanent Disability. 
Th.e Surety consistently ignores that the Commission has already rendered a factual 
finding that entirely precludes the Surety's admitted purpose in filing its complaint against the 
ISIF. The Commission held that, "[u]nder the facts of this case, the Commission has 
determined that the last accident caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent 
disability." ( emphasis added). Order Regarding Reconsideration, p. 2. Yet Surety insists it 
should be provided another opportunity to litigate that very issue. Surety is suing the ISIF for 
one purpose only - to convince this Commission that the ISIF is liable for some portion of the 
benefits which this Commission has already determined Claimant is entitled. Yet in order to 
realize that goal, Surety must convince the Commission to reverse its prior factual finding that 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO EMPLOYER/SURETY'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING- 2 
I 
Claimant's last accident did not cause Claimant to suffer total and pennanent disability because 
that last accident combined with some other pre-existing condition. 
Surety is essentially inviting the Commission to reverse a factual finding via this 
subsequent proceeding against the ISIF. The Commission must reject Surety's invitation in this 
regard. Surety's remedy was to either join the ISIF in the original proceeding or appeal the 
Commission's decision that the last accident caused Claimant's total and pennanent disability. It 
· did neither and is not allowed at this point to try to cure that omission. The Surety is stuck with 
its tactical decision in the prior litigation. The Commission should dismiss the instant complaint 
with prejudice. 
2. The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel Bars Surety's Complaint Against The ISIF. 
Surety misapplies the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Surety argues that collateral 
estoppel does not apply because the ISIF is not bound by the prior decision and the ISIF is free to 
contest the Commission's prior factual findings and conclusions oflaw. Surety's Oppos. Memo, 
p. 7-8. Surety misapplies the doctrine of collateral estoppel because it is not the ISIF that should 
be estopped in this case, it is Surety. Surety is the party bound by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel because Surety was a party to the prior proceeding in which Claimant was detennined 
to be totally and pennanently disabled as a result of his last accident which occurred while he 
was employed at Hagadone Corporation. 
Surety admits that in order to prove ISIF liability under I.C. § 72-332 in this subsequent 
action, it must prove that Claimant's pre-existing conditions combined with his last industrial 
accident to render him totally and permanently disabled. Surety's Oppos. Memo, p. 6. Yet the 
Commission, as discussed above, has already held that the Claimant's last accident caused him to 
suffer total and permanent disability. The only way for the Commission to hold otherwise is if 
Surety is allowed to introduce evidence and reargue that issue in this subsequent proceeding. 
Surety's position that the ISIF is liable for a portion of Claimant's award necessarily requires a 
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factual finding which is fundamentally inconsistent with the Connnission's prior factual finding 
on this very issue. Surety is seeking another opportunity to litigate the cause of Claimant's 
disability and seeks to have the Connnission render a decision that is in conflict with its prior 
ruling. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is designed to avoid the re-litigation of issues already 
decided, where the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Magic Valley 
Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123Idaho 434,849 P.2d 107 (1993). Surety had its chati.ceto argue 
that Claimant's pre-existing conditions combined with his last accident as the cause of his total 
and permanent disability, but for whatever reason, chose not to do so. Surety is not entitled to 
another opportunity at this stage of the proceedings to make that argument, where it failed to join 
the ISIF and failed to appeal the Connnission' s ruling. It would defeat all of the purposes of 
collateral estoppel for the Commission to allow Surety to proceed in this subsequent proceeding 
against the ISIF. The Commission must collaterally estop Surety from making that argument 
now by dismissing Surety's complaint. Moreover, the Commission has already had the hearing 
in this case and entered its findings and conclusions determining that Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled and that Surety is liable for his benefits. Surety is asking the Connnission 
to hold another evidentiary hearing on issues already heard and decided. Such an approach , if 
sanctioned, only increases the burden of the Connnission in all cases of potential total disability. 
The Surety's attempt to escape its strategic and tactical handling of the case must be rejected. 
3. Claimant's Interests Require That The Commission Dismiss Surety's Complaint. 
Surety's complaint also places Claimant in an untenable position, unfairly prejudicing his 
interests. Surety argues that, 
... the prior Industrial Commission determination is not binding and ISIF 
has the opportunity to submit its own evidence on the issues, to retain a 
vocational consultant to produce testimony as to the claimant's 
employability and to conduct such further investigation as it chooses. 
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Surety's Oppos. Memo, p. 8. The investigation and litigation Surety contemplates would allow 
the ISIF to subject Claimant to independent medical examinations as well as additional 
depositions and hearings. These proceedings would all be aimed at establishing that Claimant is 
not permanently and totally disabled or that his prior impairment(s) did not combine with his last 
accident to cause total and permanent disability. The very purpose of this litigation attempts to 
undercut a decision this Commission has already rendered - that Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled and that this disability was caused by his last accident. 
Yet Surety argues that "[a]llowing litigation of these issues as it pertains to these two 
parties would in no way affect the benefits of the claimant nor the prior decision as it pertains to 
him." Surety's Oppos. Memo, p. 8. This conclusion is simply wrong. Subjecting Claimant to· 
more litigation regarding issues relating to his totally and permanent disability would subject 
Claimant to more time and expense. Surety does not propose paying for Claimant's costs and 
attorney's fees when Claimant is forced to re-litigate once again what Claimant has already 
litigated in the prior proceeding. Claimant has already established that he is entitled to certain 
benefits. If the Commission held in this subsequent action that Claimant was not totally and 
permanently disabled, the Claimant's entitlement to total and permanent disability benefits 
would be uncertain at best. The Commission would then be faced with two conflicting 
decisions - again- exactly the type of scenario the doctrine.of collateral estoppel is designed to 
prohibit. 
Surety's complaint against the ISIP is exactly the type of litigation which the doctrine of. 
collateral estoppel precludes. To argue that Claimant would not be adversely affected by this 
subsequent proceeding simply ignores the realities of what Surety is proposing. The overriding 
policy of the Worker's Compensation Act is to provide sure and certain relief for Idaho's injured 
worker's. Allowing Surety's complaint against the ISIP to proceed would be contrary to that 
purpose. 
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4. The Current System Works. Surety Simply Failed To Properly Avail Itself Of 
The Proper Procedures. 
Joinder of the ISIF in cases where total and pennanent disability is alleged does not 
create the problems that Surety suggests. Surety's Oppos. Memo, p. 9. The Commission is well 
aware that the employer/surety's typical practice is to join the ISIF if it appears, at any stage of 
the proceeding, that a claimant may have a viable argument that he or she is totally and 
pennanently disabled as a result of presexisting impainnents and the industrial accident. This 
practice occurs despite the fact that the employer/surety might be and in most cases is actually 
joining with the Fund in contesting the claimant's total and pennanent disability claim. Surety's 
failure to engage in that practice in this case is an unusual yet entirely voluntary exception to the 
nonnal practice of the worker's compensation bar. 
Surety's newly proposed manner in which to handle litigation of the ISIF' s potential 
liability under I.C. § 72-332 would upset a system that currently works and would have 
unintended negative consequences. For example, employers/sureties may actually benefit in a 
case where there may be a pre-existing physical impainnent if the Commission finds that a 
claimant is totally and pennanently disabled. By not joining the ISIF in the original action, 
employers/sureties could give token resistance to a claimant's assertions regarding disability and 
then bring a subsequent action arguing for contribution from the ISIF. That practice is untenable 
and unfair to the ISIF and claimants, for all of the reasons set forth in this Memorandum as well 
as in the ISIF's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Declaratory Relief. 
If the Commission rules against ISIF' s Petition for Declaratory Relief and allows 
Surety's complaint to proceed, it would place Claimant's total and pennanent disability at issue 
once again, requiring a hearing on that issue. The Commission's prior finding that Claimant is 
totally and pennanently disabled, and that the cause of that disability was his last accident, 
conclusively precludes re-litigation of that issue. 
Surety failed to address the ISIF's arguments that I.C. § 72-718 barred its complaint and 
that it could not establish a prima facie case against the ISIF pursuant to LC. § 72-332. See 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO EMPLOYER/SURETY'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING- 6 
ISIF's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Declaratory Ruling, Argument, Parts Band E. 
Surety's failure to address these arguments in its Opposition Memorandum is an implicit 
admission as to the validity and persuasiveness of those arguments. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in its Memorandum in Support of 
Petition for Declaratory Relief, ISIP respectfully requests that the Commission dismiss with 
prejudice the Surety's con~t. . 
DATED This f3 day ofNovember, 2002. 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
'Kenneth L. Mallea: 
Attorney for Defendant/ISIP 
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Robert Stoddard 
c/o Thomas Mitchell 
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Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2778 
Glenna M. Christensen 
MOFFATT THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O.Box829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
~ by U.S. mail 
__ by hand delivery 
__ by facsimile 
__ by overnight mail 
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Kenneth L. Mallea 
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 14, 2001 the Commission issued its final ruling in Claimant's claim for 
benefits from the Hagadone Corporation and its two sureties, General Insurance Co. (General) 
and Royal Indemnity Company (Royal). The case consolidated Claimant's three workers' 
compensation claims. None of the parties joined the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF). 
The Commission found, among other things, that Claimant was totally and permanently disabled 
pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. In the final order, the Commission deemed Royal fully liable 
for the total permanent disability benefits. In particular the Commission found "the last accident 
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(; 
caused Claimant to suffer total and permanent disability." Order Regarding Reconsideration, 
p. 2. None of the parties appealed that decision. However, Royal subsequently filed a complaint 
against ISIF on May 22, 2002, seeking to apportion part of its liability for Claimant's total 
permanent disability benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332. 
On October 11, 2002 ISIF requested a declaratory ruling, pursuant to Rule XV, JRP, that 
would prohibit Royal from pursuing ISIF liability. Ultimately, ISIF seeks a dismissal of the 
complaint filed by Royal. A number of legal issues are presented in this declaratory ruling as 
grounds for dismissal. They are as follows: 
1. Whether the complaint against ISIF is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
2. Whether Royal waived its right to seek apportionment by failing to join ISIF in 
the previously mentioned decision. 
3. Whether the Commission's previous decision bars Royal's complaint against ISIF 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718. 
4. Whether Royal is estopped from seeking apportionment from ISIF. 
5. Whether ISIF's constitutional due process rights are violated if Royal's complaint 
is not dismissed. 
6. Whether the complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law because Royal 
cannot establish the elements ofISIF liability under Idaho Code§ 72-332. 
The Commission held a hearing en bane on May 15, 2003. Kenneth Mall ea represented 
ISIF. Glenna Christensen represented Royal. Claimant and his attorney, Thomas Mitchell, were 
present at the hearing. Claimant did not present any oral argument, but previously entered 
pleadings supporting the position ofISIF. 
DECLARATORY RULING - 2 
At hearing, Royal objected to Claimant's involvement on the grounds that Claimant was 
not a named party to the suit. Claimant is certainly an interested party to the proceedings. 
Moreover, both Royal and ISIF served copies of all the pleadings upon Claimant, as ifhe was a 
party. The objection by Royal, however, is sustained. Although Claimant is identified as a party 
to the Petition proceedings, his pecuniary interests are not actually affected by the outcome of the 
proceedings. At this point, Claimant may be a witness in any further proceedings between ISIF 
and Royal. Royal will compensate him for total permanent disability benefits, during the 
pendency of any further proceedings in this matter. 
The primary argument relied upon by ISIF is collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. ISIF 
contends that Royal's liability for total permanent disability benefits was fully and finally 
decided by the Commission's prior order on reconsideration, from which Royal did not appeal. 
Because Royal was deemed fully liable for the total permanent disability benefits, ISIF contends 
there are no remaining benefits to apportion against ISIF. Additionally, ISIF asserts the prior 
ruling is final and conclusive against Royal and cannot be relitigated. ISIF also maintains Royal 
waived its right to apportionment. Further, ISIF argues it would be placed in an unfair 
disadvantage if it were brought into litigation after the Commission previously found Claimant 
totally and permanently disabled and held Royal liable for such benefits. Finally, ISIF maintains 
that the facts do not establish its statutory liability. 
Royal opposes the petition, arguing its complaint against ISIF merely seeks contribution 
in keeping with the intent ofldaho Code§ 72-332. Royal maintains that the elements ofISIF 
liability under Idaho Code§ 72-332, such as "combines with," were not previously litigated and 
therefore the prior total permanent disability finding should not preclude the issue from being 
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litigated for purposes ofISIF liability . 
. DISPOSITION OF REQUEST 
The ruling of December 14, 2001 is clearly identified as the order and the subject of the 
petition. An actual controversy exists between Royal and ISIF concerning Royal's ability to 
pursue ISIF after the case was fully litigated between Claimant, Royal and another surety. A 
supporting memorandum setting forth the relevant facts and law accompanies ISIF' s petition. 
Therefore, the Commission finds the requirements of Rule XV, JRP, are met, and a declaratory 
ruling is an appropriate determination of the applicable issues presented herein. 
DECLARATORY RULING 
This is a case of first impression. The parties have called for judicial guidance on the 
orderly development of a complicated workers' compensation claim involving an injured worker, 
his employer, two insurance companies, and ISIF. Fundamentally, the Commission must decide 
whether ISIF may be shielded from liability by a Commission determination in previous 
litigation between an injured worker and employer. Idaho law provides a special proceeding for 
a previously impaired worker who sustains a subsequent disability and by reason of the combined 
effects, the worker is rendered totally and permanently disabled. When the elements ofldaho 
Code§ 72-332 are satisfied, ISIF is obligated to provide the injured worker lifetime benefits. 
The ISIF is funded by a levy, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-327, in which all Idaho self-insured 
employers and sureties must pay a proportionate share of the indemnity benefits paid on Idaho 
workers' compensation claims during the applicable reporting period. Other than a sixty-day 
notice requirement under Idaho Code§ 72-334, the Workers' Compensation Law in Idaho 
contains no statute of limitations on the timing of a complaint against ISIF. The purpose of ISIF 
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is to encourage employers to hire injured workers and to encourage workers with partial 
incapacitation to seek employment. Curtis v. Shoshone County Sheriffs Office, 102 Idaho 300, 
304,629 P.2d 696 (1981). Prior to its creation, an employer who hired a person with a partial 
disability was subject to the responsibility of paying for total permanent disability compensation 
to an employee rendered totally and permanently disabled because of his pre-existing condition 
coupled with a subsequent industrial injury. See McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 34 Idaho 
773,203 P. 1068 (1921). The fund was established to relieve an employer of this burden. The 
underlying policy of the fund is tq allow an employer to hire a person with a pre-existing 
impairment or disability. The employer would then have a limited exposure should a subsequent 
industrial injury render the worker totally and permanently disabled. 1927 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 
106, § 6234, p. 141; recodified in 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 124, p. 447. As in Claimant's case, 
the fund also operates to encourage employers to retain workers who have been injured but 
remain capable of working. 
1. Collateral Estoppel 
Previously at issue before the Commission was the extent of Claimant's permanent 
disability, including whether Claimant was totally disabled. (Tr. p. 10, ls. 5-10). The 
Commission ultimately found Claimant permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the odd•lot 
doctrine, and declared Royal liable for the benefits. Order Regarding Reconsideration, December 
14, 2001. The ruling was specifically framed in the context of the particular issues presented by 
the parties to the Commission. Royal did not request reconsideration or appeal the ruling. ISIF . 
now asserts Royal is collaterally estopped from relitigating liability for total permanent disability 
benefits. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has pronounced the elements necessary for the application of 
collateral estoppel. Each of the following questions must be answered in the affirmative in order 
for collateral estoppel to be applied: 
1. Did the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted have a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case? 
2. Was the issue decided in the prior litigation identical with the one 
presented in the action in question? · 
3. Was the issue actually decided in the prior litigation? 
4. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
5. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a 
party to the prior adjudication? Jackman v. Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund, 129 Idaho 689,692 (1997). 
In this case, the pivotal element for collateral estoppel analysis is whether the issue was 
actually decided in the prior litigation. ISJF defines the issue common to both the previous 
decision and the potential claim against ISJF as "liability for Claimant's disability benefits." 
Memorandum in Support of Petition, p. 7. Although the interests of judicial economy make this. 
description of the issues tempting, the Commission disagrees. The issues previously disputed 
between Claimant and Employer were not the same as the potential issues that would be litigated 
between ISJF and Royal, as explained below. 
First, consider impairment. The previous case was a consolidation of three claims. The 
Commission rendered impairment ratings for Claimant's 1996, 1997, and 1999 industrial 
injuries. Impairment related to Claimant's 1997 motor vehicle accident was not rendered. The 
impairments were analyzed under Idaho Code §§ 72-422 and 424. In a case between Royal and 
ISJF under Idaho Code § 72-332, the fundamental impairment for which ISJF could be found 
liable must meet more than the definitional requirement ofidaho Code§ 72-422. The 
impairment also must have been pre-existing at the time of the industrial accident, permanent, 
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and a hindrance to employment. See Toelcke v. State, lndust. Special Indem. Fund, 134 Idaho at 
493, 5 P.3d 471,473 (2000), quoting Dumaw v. J.L. Norton Logging, 118. Idaho 150, 154, 795 
P.2d 312,316 (1990); and See Quincy v. Quincy, 136 Idaho I, 6, 27 P.3d 410,415 (2001). 
Next, we must consider disability. The Commission addressed the disability from each 
industrial injury separately and chronologically. The 1996 hernia rendered Claimant 20% 
permanently disabled, inclusive of 10% impairment. The 1997 low back injury resulted in no 
impairment disability. The 1999 low back injury resulted in 60% disability, inclusive of the 5% 
impairment. The Commission next declared Claimant totally and permanently disabled under the 
odd-lot doctrine. Without precedent for determining percentages of liability for employers where 
ISIF is not a party, the Commission deemed Royal fully liable for the total permanent disability 
benefits in the previous case. Order Denying Reconsideration, December 14, 2001, pp. 3-4. In a 
potential case against ISIF under Idaho Code§ 72-332, the total and permanent disability must be 
the result of a combination of the pre-existing impairment described above and the subsequent 
industrial injury. Royal has acknowledged that the issue of total permanent disability may well 
have to be re-litigated. Employer's Memorandnm, p. 7. Claimant bares no risk in such a 
process. His status with Royal is secure. If the Commission reaches an inconsistent ruling, the 
ruling would only be against Royal for apportionment purposes. 
The conclusion that the issues in Royal's claim against ISIF are not collaterally estopped 
is consistent with Jackman, supra. Jackman involved a previous settlement with his employer 
for 33% impairment due to L6-S1 spondylolisthesis, right hip pain, and a total hip arthroplasty. 
Later, Jackman filed a claim against ISIF seeking to apportion the 33% whole person impairment 
into 13% pre-existing pennanent physical impairment and 20% attributable to the industrial 
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accident. The Court, leery of a double recovery for the same impairment, held the claim against 
ISIF collaterally estopped becanse the issues were identical. Jackman had failed to present 
additional impairment for which the employer was not liable. In the case at hand, Royal is 
pursuing ISIF liability after the Commission pronounced Royal liable to Claimant. The risk of 
double recovery would not exist. 
Our conclusion that collateral estoppel does not bar the issues against ISIF also comports 
with the guidance provided in a case decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals. In Robertson 
Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 9,952 P.2d 914 (1998), the Court found, among other things, 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable. Robertson Supply sought to collect on a $12,000 
debt. Robertson first received a default judgment against the corporate entity for the entire 
$12;000 debt1• However, the debt was virtually unrecoverable, so Robertson Supply 
subsequently sued Nicholls personally for $7,150 of the debt. The Court found collateral 
estoppel was not a bar to the claim. Although the claim arose from the same facts, the 
defendants were different, so the issues were deemed different enough to withstand a collateral 
estoppel defense. Quoting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the Court took note that: 
[t]he interests of conserving judicial resources, of maintaining consistency, and of 
avoiding oppression or harassment of the adverse party are less compelling when 
the issue on which preclusion is sought has not actually been litigated before. 
And if preclusive effect were given to issues not litigated, the result might serve to 
discourage compromise, to decrease the likelihood that the issues in an action 
would be narrowed by stipulation, and thus to intensify litigation. Robertson 
Supply, Inc., at 918. 
Just as the issues and theories in the two Robertson Supply cases were different, the 
issues and theories in the two Stoddard cases are different. In Robertson Supply, the creditor 
I The numbers in Robertson Supply. Inc. have been rounded for ease of analysis. 
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sought fu!i reimbursement on the debt in the first suit, and then the creditor sought partial 
reimbursement from another party who shared in the obligation for the debt. In Stoddard, 
Claimant first received full recovery on his workers' compensation claim in the suit against 
Employer, now Employer seeks ISIF's contributive share of the obligation. Like Robertson 
S_upply, the potential for inconsistent rulings is not a prevailing concern where the issues have 
not actually been litigated. 
Thus, the Commission finds the issues in Royal's complaint against ISIF are not barred 
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
2. Waiver 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right. Brand S. Corporation 
v. King; 102 Idaho 731,639 P.2d 429 (1981). There is no direct evidence that Royal 
intentionally relinquished its right to pursue ISIF liability by not joining ISIF in the previous 
case. Although Royal knew Claimant alleged he was totally and permanently disabled, there is 
no statutory language in the workers' compensation Jaw requiring ISIF to be joined into an 
original cause of action. The right to pursue ISIF liability, as it is written in Idaho Code 
§ 72-332, does not expire at any given point in the process of litigation. For example, Claimants 
often settle their cases with employers and then seek ISIF liability. See Jackman supra, Tagg v. 
State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 123 Idaho 95, 844 P.2d 1345 (1993), and Sines v. 
Appel, 103 Idaho 9,644 P.2d 331 (1982). Therefore, the Commission finds Royal did not waive 
its right to pursue ISIF liability. As expressed by the Commission in its prior decision between 
Claimant and Employer, the law is silent on how to apportion the liability of an employer in total 
permanent disability cases with facts indicating pre-existing physical impairn1ent. 
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3. Idaho Code § 72-718 
"Idaho Code§ 72-718 is a departure from 'pure resjudicata' and operates to make 
Industrial Commission decisions final and conclusive only as to matters actually considered and 
adjudicated by the Commission." (Emphasis added.) Togg, supra at 98, 1348. Res judicata, " .. 
. may not apply unless both individuals were party to a previous judgment .... " Brown v. State 
ofldaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund; Idaho Supreme Court Opinion No. 23, p. 3. (2003). 
Royal was a party to the previous judgment, but ISIF was not. Therefore, the Commission finds 
Idaho Code§ 72-718 does not bar Royal's complaint against ISIF. See Sines v. Appel, 103 
Idaho 9, 644 P.2d 331 (1982). 
4. Quasi-Estoppel 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel may be invoked against a person asserting a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him, with knowledge .of the facts and his rights, 
to the detriment of the person seeking to apply the doctrine. Young v. Idaho Department of Law 
Enforcement (Alcohol Beverage Control Division), 123 Idaho 870, 875, 853 P.2d 615, 620 
(1993), citing Evans v. Tax Comm'n, 97 Idaho 148, 540 P.2d 810 (1975); Treasure Valley Bank 
v. Butcher, 121 Idaho 531,826 P.2d 492 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Royal previously asserted Claimant was not entitled to disability beyond impairment. 
Royal did not prevail in that regard.· Now, in asserting ISIF liability, Royal must argue that 
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. These positions are inconsistent. Royal was aware 
of the facts strongly implicating ISIF's involvement in the case during the prior litigation. Total 
permanent disability had been a noticed issue. Royal's right to pursue ISIF liability was known 
by Royal at the time of the previous litigation. However, the Commission finds no indication 
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that it would be detrimental to ISIF to allow Royal to pursue ISIF' s liability at this point. ISIF 
faces no re-litigation expense because it was not a party to the prior litigation. Royal must· 
shoulder the burden of double litigatio[ Th'e question of total permanent disability for purposes 
ofidaho Code§ 72-332 would be undetermined between Royal and ISIF. The only ghosts from 
the Commission's previous determinations which could come up to haunt ISIF would be the 
previous PPI ratings for the 1996, 1997, and 1999 industrial acci~enti}However, this has been 
proclaimed appropriate by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Quincy. supra; and Smith v. J.B. 
Parson Co., 127 Idaho 937,908 P.2d 1244 (1996). Therefore, the Commission finds ISIF has not 
presented a factual basis to dismiss Royal's claim against ISIF under the theory of quasi-estoppel. 
5. Due Process 
State and federal due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard on an issue that affects a party's property interests. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 
136 Idaho 63, 28 P.3d 1006 (2001). The Commission finds ISIF's argument for violation of due 
process is unpersuasive. The elements ofidaho Code§ 72-332 were not addressed in the prior 
Commission: decision, and ISIF was not declared liable. Those issues would be addressed anew, 
after notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, in Royal's claim against ISIF. The 
Commission finds ISIF's due process rights are not offended by the complaint and pending 
litigation between Royal and ISIF. 
6. Elements of ISIF Liability 
Since no facts have been developed in this proceeding, the elements ofISIF liability 
under Idaho Code§ 72-332 are more appropriate for an administrative hearing. These issues will 
be more fully explored by the parties in such a hearing. The Commission, therefore, declines to 
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rule on this aspect ofISIF's request. Rule XV, (F)(4)(e), JRP. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission has concluded the legal theories of collateral estoppel, waiver, Idaho 
Code § 72-718, quasi estoppel, and due process are not a bar to Royal's complaint against ISIF. 
Although in hindsight the interests of judicial economy may have beckoned for the joinder of 
ISIF in the original cause of action between Claimant, and his employer and the two sureties, the 
law does not require it. The ISIF is funded by a levy from employers/sureties and there is no 
statute oflimitations in Idaho Code§ 72-332 for claims against ISIF. Workers and employers 
benefit from the ISIF. Its purpose would be thwarted if a claim against ISIF were not permitted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this _2J_ day of Q,, '3' 141:, 2003. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Otza. ~ 
R. D. Maynar~~ 
~ Kile, Commis 
ATTEST: 
Ass stant Commission Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the a]_ dayoij,~, 4.ft-2003 a true and correct copy of 
Declaratory Ruling was served by regular United ates mail· upon each of the following: 
GLENNA M CHRISTENSEN 
POBOX829 
BOISE ID 83701-0829 
KENNETH L MALLEA . 
POBOX857 
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A courtesy copy was sent to: 
JOHN T MITCHELL 
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